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ARTICLE TWO OF THE UCC
I. INTRODUCTION
This is first and foremost a comment on consumer protection,
with particular emphasis upon the low-income consumer, rather
than an analysis of specific sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code.1 The UCC presently offers certain protection for those con-
sumers who have been the victims of a "bad" contract. In the sales
article, Article Two, there are two concepts which are especially
important for the consumer: unconscionability, covered by section
2-302, and warranty, covered by sections 2-313 through 2-316. In dis-
cussing these sections, however, other sections must be mentioned,
as one can rarely discuss one section of the UCC intelligently
in any given situation,2 without considering several other sections.
This comment proposes to examine consumer protection already
available under the UCC, focusing upon the concepts of unconscion-
ability and warranty. A brief history followed by an analysis of
commentary and case law will be presented to demonstrate how
the UCC may be utilized in numerous fact situations. Problems
which hinder the application of existing protection will also be
discussed, but this study is by no means exhaustive of the problems
over which the UCC has no control.
In discussing protection for the consumer, this comment will
not be speaking only of the ghetto dweller, although many of the
cases do involve such persons. The consumer to whom this comment
is or may be relevant can be a person of any economic level, but
more than likely he is a lower middle-class individual and is "an
I The 1958 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted by the
Seventy-third Session (1963) of the Nebraska Legislature. [herein-
after UCC].
2For example, the concept of "good faith performance" which is often
mentioned in tandem with both the unconscionability and warranty
sections must necessarily be included within this comment. See Farns-
worth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonab'eness-
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 666 (1963)[hereinafter cited as Farnsworth], for an excellent discussion of this
topic, in which Farnsworth examines which standard of "good faith" is
required in Article Two transactions, that generally applied through
UCC § 1-203 as defined in UCC § 1-201(19), or the "special mer-
chant's definition of 'good faith' under which 'good faith' in that
article [Article Two] means 'honesty in fact' and observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id. at
668.
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increasingly frustrated and embittered man with $10,000 desires,
$5,000 needs, and $2,000 income."s It is this comment's premise that
the consumer does not need further commissions or governmental
agencies (with the exception of more OEO lawyers) for protection
because there now exist effective means to provide a good measure
of protection. In fact, much of the legislation requiring truth in
packaging or truth in lending may not be of any assistance to the
low income consumer if that is to whom it is directed: "[I]t will
be of little help to the poor because it pre-supposes values, motiva-
tion, and knowledge which do not generally exist among them. '4
The type of protection which section 2-302 provides, limits or
negates contract liability for a "bad deal." It may be paternalistic or
it may subvert the freedom to contract (at least to do so badly),
but that is what many feel the defense of unconscionability has
always entailed.
Since it often costs the consumer as much in attorney's fees
to break an "illegal" contract as it does to just pay it off, the
protection available under the UCC has been useful mainly to the
legal aid associations but to few others. If, however, the protection
could begin to be utilized on a large scale, the need for further
legislation creating governmental agencies to provide consumer
protection would diminish.
The concepts of unconscionability and warranty, as they have
evolved under decisions construing the UCC, can be the basis for
an extension of consumer protection to business transactions involv-
ing not only the poor but others also. Courts have used the UCC
as authority for providing protection to a greater degree than
previously available, and have shown little hesitancy in expanding
protection to the extent the next case has required.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. CONCEPT AND COMMENTARY
The business of "satisfying" the low income consumer's wants is
very lucrative. Lack of ready money causes the poor consumer to
rely on credit, and lack of knowledge about credit multiplies his di-
lemma. The merchant is the master of the situation herein consid-
ered, whereas the consumer lacks both buying and bargaining
knowledge and skill. He depends upon the other party, the seller, to
inform him of the "good deal" he is getting.
3 Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two,
73 YLE L.J. 199, 200 (1963).
4 Id. at 201.
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The type of sale in which the low income consumer most often
becomes embroiled is one for personal or household goods, but cases
have included instances of small farmers dealing for a tractor or a
party buying a freezer for use in a boarding house.5 Whenever a dis-
pute arises over a contract between parties of apparently unequal
bargaining strength section 2-3026 of the UCC becomes important.
Section 2-302 authorizes a court to take evidence of the actual
commercial setting existing at the time the parties bargained. This
analysis of the "realities" of a contract's creation can be the key
to unlocking contracts for the unwary consumer. The principle of
section 2-302 does not subvert the freedom to contract; rather it
allows enforcement only of contracts freely made. When inequality
of bargaining power allows one party to include terms in a contract
which "business risk" cannot justify, section 2-302 is the appropriate
protection for the consumer. 7
The history of section 2-302 is evidence of the expansive nature
of the concept of unconscionability. There may, in fact, be two
types of unconscionability: procedural and substantive.8 At least
this is a distinction Arthur Leff feels should be made while empha-
sizing that "naughty bargaining" is a certain sign some type of
unconscionability exists in any resulting contract. The early history
of 2-302 concentrated on this bargaining unconscionability, or what
Leff labels "procedural unconscionability."9 However, the later
5 Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745
(1967).6 UCC § 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and the effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
7 Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Mca. L. REv. 1465, 1469
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Skilton & Helstad].
- Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff]. There are two
distinct situations involved in watching for unconscionable contracts,
one growing out of the process of contracting and the other having
to do with the resulting contract. Leff refers to bargaining naughtiness
as "procedural unconscionability" and to evils in the resulting con-
tract as "substantive unconscionability." Id. at 487.
9 Id. at 487.
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drafts of the UCC moved away from this clear standard for finding
"bad" contracts and he criticizes the statute, as it now reads, because
"one cannot tell from the statute whether the key concept is some-
thing to be predicted on the bargaining process or on the bargain or
on some combination of the two."'0
The best answer to this criticism is perhaps a simple "Yes,
that's true." The "beauty" of the section, however, may well be the
fact that the court is free to "police explicitly against" anything
which makes a particular contract unconscionable.'
Substantive unconscionability, as Leff sees it in the present UCC,
allows the court to strike from a contract any one particular clause
which it finds has an unconscionable effect, yet keep the remainder
of the contract in force. According to Leff, "the progression through
the drafts of the idea of substantive unconscionability, from overall
imbalance to one-clause naughtiness, is the most important single
transformation disclosed by a study of drafting history.' 21
The vagueness of the UCC as to what constitutes substantive
unconscionability is not cleared up by the official comment to 2-302.
The cases listed therein rely heavily on the old equity cases which,
Leff argues, are not good precedent for the application of the UCC
unconscionability statute.13 The criticism advanced, that dramatic
situations are often not present in the typical sales context, is of
doubtful validity. In the absence of a delineation of what "dramatic
situations which have produced the contracts" includes, it could
be imagined that the sale of goods to a low income consumer who
is very unlikely to meet his contract obligations, is no less dramatic.
Whatever the weight of Leff's criticism as to differentiation of
the types of unconscionability and section 2-302's failure to dis-
tinguish between procedural and substantive unconscionability, the
history of section 2-302 is replete with the drafters' concern over
the injustice which both hold for a consumer. The direction and
effect of the language in 2-302 instructing a court to police explicitly
10 Id.
" See Ochs, Uniform Commercial Code-Unconscionability, 7 WAsH-
BuRN L.J. 415 (1968); Stuntbecke, The Doctrine of Unconscionability,
19 MAINE L. REv. 513 (1967).
12 Leff, note 8 supra, at 513.
13 Id. at 533. Leff argues that (1) they only give the limits of procedural
unconscionability and cannot define what kinds of clauses are sub-
stantively unconscionable because the only kind of substantive uncon-
scionability the equity cases ever dealt with was over-all imbalance
in a contract; and (2) the dramatic situations which produced the
equity result are exceedingly unlikely to be reproduced in a sales
context except on very rare occasions.
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against unconscionable contracts, however, does seem to justify
Leff's observation that:
[Neither] the dramatic situation of two persons bargaining nor
the 'unbalance' or 'lopsidedness' or the quality of the resulting
contract, but rather the emotional state of the trier which willjustify his use of the section [mean] the attitudes relevant under
section 2-302 are not those of the parties but those of the judges.
The pictures sought in the facts are not of the varieties of oppres-
sive or surprising negotiations . . . but rather of oppressed or
surprised judges [with] pulses [racing] or their cheeks red-
den[ed] .... 14
Since, from the seller's viewpoint, the low income consumer may
well represent a high risk, price and credit provisions of contracts
with such parties may indeed read harshly before their necessity
need be doubted. This does not mean, however, that a merchant
seeking to hold the other party to such contract terms can neglect
to take adequate measures to disclose to him the terms' existence,
and explain their meaning to him during the bargaining stage of a
contract. Factors like the price the consumer is actually paying for
goods must be made painstakingly clear to him, for the courts have
demonstrated a willingness to void unclear price provisions as
unconscionable on the authority of 2-302. Nothing is really said in
2-302 to this end, but its mere presence perhaps dispels court
hesitancy to go further than ever before in screening contracts.15
Section 2-302 specifically authorizes court scrutiny of the com-
mercial setting, the purposes, and the effect of any agreement.
Admittedly it has not universally been agreed that courts have any
business concerning themselves with the particular terms of any
contract, or how certain terms came to be included within a contract,
but perhaps that philosophy was the product of another legal age
soon to be discarded. Writers in the Michigan Law Review16 have
suggested such by arguing that section 2-302 merely authorizes
courts to take action which the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires they take.
In suggesting that consumers have a constitutional right not to
have unconscionable contracts enforced against them, Robert Skil-
ton and Richard Helstad believe that since judicial action is state
action, and that since the state may not deprive a person of his prop-
erty without due process of law, the enforcement of procedural safe-
guards in criminal law implies required observance of minimal
standards of justice in a state judiciary proceeding on civil contract
14 Id. at 516.
15 Skilton & Helstad, note 7 supra, at 1474.
16 Id.
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rights or liabilities. For example, a confession of judgment by power
of attorney bestowed through a form contract, without giving the
defendant notice of the power in the contract or of the actual
proceeding so he can defend against the merits of the claim, may
deprive that consumer of his property without due process of law.17
The implementation of Shelley v. Kraemer 8 and Barrows v.
Jackson19 may extend beyond the aspects of judicial action as state
action therein involved.
Without going so far as to identify consumer protection with
constitutional rights, the fundamental fairness of not enforcing
unconscionable contracts, or particular provisions, the above is
certainly'not foreign to Anglo-American legal thought. Courts have
always shown a willingness to guard against over-reaching or
one-sided bargaining.20 The hesitancy which the presence of section
2-302 dispels, is one courts should gladly put aside when the facts
before them present a one-sided transaction in which one party
has taken advantage of the other.
As previously mentioned the section on unconscionability, like
any particular section of the UCC, is effected by the applicability
of other UCC sections to a case at hand. More specifically, the
defense of unconscionability is used by a consumer against his
seller. Usually, however, a contract made by a merchant with a
low income consumer is assigned to a finance company at the first
opportunity, and the risk of collection is then someone else's
problem. The relationship between the seller and the assignee is
crucial under the UCC. The consumer may lose his opportunity to
defend against a contract on the grounds of fraud or unconscion-
ability if the assignee can meet the requirements UCC sections
3-302, 1-203, 1-201 (19), and perhaps 2-103 (1) (b) impose on him.21
These sections have to do with being a holder in due course and the
requirement of "good faith" under the UCC. Section 1-203 imposes
an obligation on every contract or duty under the UCC of "good
faith" in its performance or enforcement. 22 "Good faith" is defined
in 1-201(19) to mean or require "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned. 2 3
17 Id. at 1475.
Is 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
20 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942).
21 Farnsworth, note 2 supra. For the text of the cited UCC sections see
note 47 infra.
22 Id. at 666, quoting, UCC § 1-203.
23 UCC § 1-201(19).
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However, Article Two contains "a special merchant's definition
of 'good faith' [which] in that article means 'honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade.' "24 This requirement of "good faith" on the merchant
is not only valuable for the purposes of deciding if an assignee is a
holder in due course and thus immune from the buyer's defenses
against the seller, but it is also valuable as a criteria for judging
the unconscionability of any particular contract clause from a sub-
stantive point of view.
As E. Allen Farnsworth indicates, while many feel there is "no
overriding general positive duty of good faith imposed on the
parties to a contract, '25 the courts of New York and California have
continually asserted "that every contract includes an implicit obli-
gation of good faith and fair dealing. '2 6
The concept of good faith performance is also embodied in the
UCC, and Farnsworth argues that "both common sense and tradi-
tion dictate an objective standard for good faith performance ...
based on decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community and
not the individual's own belief as to what might be decent, fair or
reasonable."' '
Farnsworth also believes that sections of Article Two not ex-
pressly requiring good faith still are governed by the general
obligation imposed by Article One. Moreover, in those situations
where an obligation of good faith is imposed generally, sections of
Article Two which are involved are governed by the special mer-
chant's definition of good faith included in 2-103(1) (b), and incorpo-
rate the objective standard of commercial reasonableness.2 8 If, in
examining the factual situations before it, a court is to judge the
commercial setting, effect, and purpose of any contract by an objec-
tive standard of good faith and commercial reasonableness, then
a determination of what amounts to substantive unconscionability
under 2-302 is not in fact left to be accomplished without some
objective guidelines. 29
24 Farnsworth, note 2 supra, at 666, quoting, UCC § 1-203.
25 Id. at 671, quoting, Professor Raphael Powell.
26 Id. at 671.
27 Id. at 672.
28 Id. at 675.
29 "Still, the lesson is there, and the Code's concepts of good faith and
commercial reasonableness await development, even beyond the
bounds of the Code, at the hands of resourceful lawyers and creative
judges." Id. at 679.
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The requirements of good faith imposed on the assignee can
allow the consumer to exert the defense of unconscionability when
the court finds misconduct in the seller-assignee relations. In
part II of this comment there are examples of the interplay
between UCC sections on good faith and unconscionability and the
reader should realize the tandem effect of the sections in providing
consumer protection.
With a history of section 2-302 in mind, coupled with the drafters'
indecision as to which "type" of unconscionability to include in the
section, and the relationship that the UCC provisions on good faith
may have on the finding of unconscionability or the use of it as a
defense against an assignee of some consumer's purchase agreement,
a case study of past UCC application to consumer problems would
now be useful. The cases included below are not for the purpose
of critical analysis of the legal theory involved, but as examples of
available consumer protection. Some additional commentary on
particular cases has been given when its thrust is to the usefulness
of that case as a tool for the consumer's attorney.
B. CASE EXAMPLES
Price and credit provisions have been the basis of many court
findings of unconscionability to date. A landmark case applying
the unconscionability concepts inherent in section 2-302 (even
though the UCC was not in effect at the time the disputed contract
was made) is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company.30
In that case the plaintiff furniture company sued to replevy furni-
ture on which the defendant, Mrs. Williams, still owed a balance.
This actually included all items she had ever purchased from the
plaintiff from the year 1957, as every sales contract she had signed
subsequent to that year was "added-on" to the previous contract
and a running balance for each particular item was maintained
rather than an accumulated balance like that of a "revolving-charge"
account. Thus there existed a balance always payable until the
balances on every single item purchased were retired.31 The de-
fendant had been able to pay off over one thousand fifty-six dollars
of the more than fifteen hundred dollars worth of goods purchased
from the defendant when she defaulted on her monthly payments.
30 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
31 As Mrs. Williams made monthly payments the amount paid was pro-
rated among her outstanding debts in ratio to the size of each indi-
vidual balance to her total debt. There existed at all times a balance
on each item ever purchased varying from three cents on a December
31, 1957 purchase of $13.71 to a $327.89 balance on the $514.95 stereo
purchase which caused the lawsuit. Id.
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The default was largely caused by the acquisition of a five hundred
fifteen dollar stereo unit, also by means of time-purchase. The back
of the stereo sales contract which she signed stated her monthly
income was two hundred eighteen dollars from welfare payments.
Mrs. Williams contacted the Legal Assistance Office in Washing-
ton, D.C. to take her case. Its attorneys conceded the stereo unit
should be returned to the defendant, but were not willing to agree
to returning the remainder of the goods even though she may have
still owed a bookkeeping balance on them. On appeal from a
judgment in the store's favor, the court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case for a determination as to whether the contract
was unconscionable from its creation. The appeals court held that
unconscionability as presented in the UCC was a defense at common
law, and therefore available to the defendant even though the UCC
had not yet been adopted by Congress as law in Washington, D.C.
The elements of the defense included the absence of any meaningful
choice, and the presence of terms unreasonably favorable to one
party. The court listed criteria which the trial court could use in
deciding if a meaningful choice was available to the defendant as
a bargaining party.
The trial court should determine: (1) whether there existed gross
inequality in bargaining power; (2) the manner in which the con-
tract was entered; (3) whether there was evidence of one-sidedness
on the face of the contract; (4) whether there could be a presump-
tion of fraud from the unfair nature of the contract terms; and (5)
what were the characteristics (bargaining power and commercial
knowledge) of the parties themselves.32
It is not difficult to understand why the court in the Williams
case was willing to police explicitly against unconscionability. "For
those of us [who] have an instinctive and infallible sense of justice
(and which of us does not), any other result in this case is un-
imaginable."33 But it is difficult to pinpoint exactly from what the
Williams court has protected the consumer. Certainly the five
criteria the court of appeals listed in their opinion are valuable aids
for the examination of a commereial setting under 2-302(2), but
32 Id. at 449-50. See also, In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Company,
Inc., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966), where, in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding involving a question of enforcement of a security agreement
between the bankrupt and a creditor, which the referee found to be
unconscionable, the appellate court remanded for another hearing
and reminded the referee that unconscionability involved a showing
of onerous terms with regard to any reasonable business relationship
to the risks or commercial environment present.
33 Leff, note 8 supra, at 552.
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one cannot be sure if the actual decision in Williams is based upon
the add-on clause or the naked act of selling such a luxury item to
a welfare recipient.3 4 It would appear though, that both procedural
or bargaining unconscionability in the "Leff" sense, and substantive
unconscionability, due to the terms of the contract, are targets of
the criteria the court reviewed for finding unconscionability.
Another case concerning the price the consumer is ultimately
paying for the goods he purchases is Central Budget Corp. v.
Sanchez,3 cited in Williams. There, a motion for summary judgment
on an automobile sales contract was withheld until the buyer had a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the commercial set-
ting of the contract, pursuant to 2-302(2). Unless the court deter-
mined otherwise after seeing the evidence, the price charged for
a 1959 Buick may have been so excessive that it was unconscionable.
If the court had sustained the motion for summary judgment the
buyer's liability for the purchase would have amounted to a total
price of one thousand eighty-two dollars, which included the auto
price of nine hundred thirty-nine dollars plus a credit service charge
of two hundred forty-two dollars.
The lower court was directed to consider not only the obvious
education (or lack thereof) of each party, but the probabilities that
such education could have reasonably prevented an understanding
of the contract terms. In addition, the effect of fine print and other
deceptive sales practices used on the buyer was to be. ascertained.
Both Williams and Sanchez emphasize the double-barrelled
power of 2-302 to void contracts where the bargaining has prevented
a consent from the buyer, and where the terms themselves are such
that public policy will not allow them to be enforced in courts of
law and equity. By evaluating factors like the education, bargaining
knowledge, and skill and general personal characteristics of the
consumer, the court is able to best judge the commercial setting
which produced what looks like an unconscionable contract. If the
UCC dispels court hesitancy in examining such factors as these, then
effective consumer protection through use of the legal process can
be a viable force.
Another source of unconscionable contracts has been door-to-door
solicitation sales of food freezers. The sales techniques and prices
charged in the sales contracts have been the main reasons for
voiding such sales. In New York and New Jersey there have been
a series of cases, all having the same basic factual circumstances, to
34 Id. at 554. "ITihe act of having sold this expensive item to a poor
person knowing of her poverty." Id. at 555.
35 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1967).
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which the courts have applied section 2-302 and the good faith
requirements for an assignee in order to protect a consumer from
an unconscionable deal.
A brief sketch of the facts in this type of case will serve both
as an example of typical consumer problems, and as a necessary
preface to a discussion of the legalities of the cases. A salesman
from a company retailing the home freezers calls upon the con-
sumer at his home to present to him "the bargain of a lifetime." The
consumer is offered enrollment in a food club in which purchase of
large amounts of food, at discount prices, will carry with it the
"bonus" of a new freezer.
After getting the consumer's signature on the contract, which
incidentally is a secured purchase agreement for a food freezer,
the selling company quickly assigns such to a finance company. In
all likelihood the consumer will never again hear from the salesman
or the company. The food which the consumer expects to receive
usually arrives within one month, but the case histories have
revealed a rather unique assortment of groceries in the deliveries.86
Only when the postman arrives delivering this previously "signed-
in-blank" contract could the purchaser realize that he has signed
not only a secured purchase agreement, but also a promissory note
for the food freezer and perhaps even an attached power of attorney
for a confession of judgment.3 7
When the entire transaction has unfolded, the consumer finds
he has purchased a food freezer worth two to three hundred dollars
on installment payments over the next three years. His total
liability is from nine to eleven hundred dollars (depending upon
the size of commissions and credit charges).
While the above happenings cannot be labeled "honest dealings,"
the consumer would have difficulty proving them illegal. The
merchant is providing something of value for the consumer's
promise to pay, for after all, a food freezer is good consideration.
The element of unconscionability comes from one of the other
36 They have included plenty of soaps, kitchen cleaners, bathroom clean-
ers, and other non-freezables, but a scarcity of fresh frozen goods like
fruit juices, vegetables, or meats. Westfield Investment Co. v. Fellers,
74 N.J. Super. 575, 581, 181 A.2d 809, 812-13 (1962).
37 The terms of the installments have often called for thirty to thirty-six
monthly payments of about $30.00. The contract provisions which
included the delivery of food are assigned to a food servicing agency,
which agrees to make three deliveries of food to the consumer's
address. The cost of these food deliveries is really a cost-of-sale item
to the selling company added to the price of the food freezer and
passed on to the consumer. Id.
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advantages which was mentioned above as being integrated into
the sales talk. The referral credit arrangements by which a buyer
can retire most of the debt he has incurred for the contract have
been the objects of the courts' disapproval. These plans promise
that for every lead the buyer furnished to the seller an amount of
money would either be paid directly to him, or credited to his
account. The more sophisticated selling operations have been known
to have actually sent a buyer some money, though never as much
as owed under the terms of the arrangement.
All of this may sound too incredible to have actually happened,
but the large number of these sales which have actually taken
place is even more incredible, as was revealed in Westfield Invest-
ment Company v. Fellers.38 In that case the local constable boasted
he had repossessed three to five hundred freezers in one year alone.39
In Frostifresh Corporation v. Reynoso 40 the court specifically
held that the price provisions and the use of referral credit in selling
practices rendered the contract therein unconscionable. The con-
sumer in Frostifresh spoke only Spanish, thus the oral negotiations
were conducted through an interpreter employed by the company,
but the court gave no hint that that added to the actual finding of
unconscionability. What it did find was that the contract terms
were too hard a bargain. It limited the seller's default recovery to
the actual cost of the freezer without commissions, legal fees, service
charges or other overhead costs, and Reynoso kept the freezer. In
doing so, the court felt obliged to reaffirm that the UCC allows
parties to freely make whatever kind of contracts they desire, so
long as no fraud or illegality exists therein, but the court also
pointed out that under section 2-302 it had a duty to police con-
tracts to prevent unconscionable dealings.
The consumer, Reynoso, had continually told the seller he could
not afford to enter a contract for so much money because he was to
be laid-off his job in the near future. Evidently the salesman's
assurances that the referral credit plan could help in meeting the
contract obligations convinced Reynoso to make the purchase.
This case is exemplary of the type of protection the UCC can
give the consumer against the "bad" contract.4 1 The court found a
combination of substantive and procedural unconscionability, to
borrow Leff's terms. Presumably the price in any contract is a
38 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962).
39 Id. at 590, 181 A.2d at 818.
40 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd as to remedy, 54 Misc. 2d
119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
41 See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
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reflection of supply and demand forces. If the court is finding the
price a consumer is willing to pay for an item unconscionable, it is
implying that a heavy burden rests on those sellers engaged in
dealing with the low income consumer not to maximize profits to
an extent which takes advantage of some increased demand force
exerted by the low income consumer. The seller seems to have an
affirmative duty to deal in a commercially reasonable manner, and
not to drive "too hard a bargain." Of course, the court in Frostifresh
could have grounded the decision on the use of the referral-credit
ploy alone as an unconscionable bargaining technique which tainted
any resulting contract in the same shade.
The New York court's disapproval of the reimbursement gimmick
was revealed in State v. ITM, Inc.42 The Attorney General of New
York, acting pursuant to executive law, brought suit to enjoin
freezer sales and sellers utilizing fraudulent and illegal tactics. In
granting the injunction, the court held there existed a duty on
sellers involved in these programs to reveal to purchasers such
things as their respective standing in the geometric progression of
possible leads which grew out of the referral credit program. Citing
as authority section 2-302, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company and American Home Improvements, Inc. v. MacIver43
the court concluded there was no doubt about the unreasonableness
and unfairness of the sales agreement in the food-freezer trans-
actions.
The court's issuance of an injunction was coupled with the fol-
lowing statement concerning the merchant-consumer relationship:
No longer do we believe that fraud may be perpetrated by the cry
of 'caveat emptor!' We have reached the point where 'Let the buyer
beware' is poor business philosophy for a social order allegedly
based upon man's respect for his fellow man. Let the seller beware,
too! 44
In addition, the opinion outlined what is expected of sellers, if they
are to deal fairly with the consumer:
42 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
43 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964), held a contract signed in blank, to
be sent to the purchaser on a later date and which included credit
terms never revealed to him, violated state law and further was unen-
forceable because of the adoption of section 2-302 of the UCC. The
price the consumer was to pay ($1609 including an $800 commission
paid to the salesman) was unconscionable. For an in depth criticism
of the MacIver decision see Leff, note 8 supra, at 550.
4 State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (1966).
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We also believe that it is right, proper, just and equitable to tell
the consumer, clearly and adequately, that he is personally liable
for the entire contract price and that he will be required to make
stipulated monthly payments plus carrying charges etc., in language
that the least educated person can understand.4 5
If ever language was alien to the sales approach used by door-to-
door salesmen, the calm, matter-of-fact disclosure the court felt was
necessary to reveal contract realities of the bargain being presented
certainly qualifies.
Coupling the challenge to "let the seller beware, too," with the
argument that one may have a constitutional right to due process
in the administration of civil law, and the policy and law established
by existing cases on unconscionability, an idea of the scope of pro-
tection that section 2-302 can provide begins to emerge. However,
no court has yet applied the Lefkowitz standards to a merchant's
sales pitch, so we can not be sure of its extent. Traditionally, the
seller has been able to rely on the buyer's ability to manage his own
affairs in contract negotiation, but if courts move in the direction
some of the decisions and commentary predict, the seller may have
to carefully make sure the party across from him in bargaining is
his equal before any resulting contract will be enforceable.46
Before leaving the discussion of section 2-302, a more detailed
look at how the requirement of good faith imposed by the UCC can
affect the existence and use of unconscionability as a defense is in
order.
C. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND GOOD FAITH UNDER THE UCC
Section 1-203 imposes an obligation of good faith on all trans-
actions taking place under the UCC. Section 1-201 (19) defines what
good faith means for the purposes of section 1-203. 4 In the sales
transactions discussed above, it was mentioned that in most cases
the seller quickly assigned any contract he made to a finance
company. For that company to take the assignment as a holder in
45 Id.
40 As to the limitation of protection of section 2-302 see Pearson v. Na-
tional Budgeting Systems, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 792, 297 N.Y.S.2d 59(1969), holding a buyer may not sue to recover punitive damages on
authority of section 2-302.
47 UCC § 1-203. Obligation of Good Faith.
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.
UCC § 1-201. General Definitions.(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned.
See also the discussion surrounding notes 13 through 21 supra.
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due course, under section 3-202, it must have acted in good faith.
If the assignee takes the contract in good faith it is immune
from any defenses the buyer may have had against his seller.4
In construing section 1-201(19), which provides that good faith
means honesty-in-fact, the courts again have shown a willingness to
examine the realities of the assignment transaction-the actual
relationship existing between the seller and the finance company-
before they find honesty-in-fact. 49 This has had the effect of circum-
scribing what was once almost blanket protection for a finance
company-assignee, and thus has provided more consumer protection.
Norman v. Worldwide Distributors, Inc.50 is a good example
of the use of both the good faith sections and unconscionability
protection. The buyer, Norman, petitioned to have a judgment
obtained by an assignee of his promissory note set aside, and
also have the contract rescinded on the grounds of fraud. The
holder of the note appealed from the trial court's finding for
the consumer. The named defendant in the suit is the selling agency
with whom the contract was made; the actual holder of the note
was a business called Peoples National Fund, Inc.
The sale was much like the freezer examples, but was for
breakfront cabinets, not food-freezers. The sales pitch included
the referral credit plan by which the buyer received five dollars for
just submitting names which were contacted, and another twenty
dollars if that party also purchased.61 When the previously signed
purchase agreement arrived at the consumer's home the buyer
learned he had agreed to pay $35.95 for the next thirty months for
a three hundred dollar cabinet. 52 The contract was returned to him,
not by the seller, but by the finance company, Peoples Fund. When
he contacted Peoples about referral credits he believed were owed
to him, Norman was told that the company knew such plans existed,
but that the contract of Norman's they held contained no language
48 See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Ruv. 395 (1966), deal-
ing specifically with the practical problems the consumer faces when
a finance company buys a contract and asserts holder in due course
immunity against a claim subsequently arising from the contract.
49 See Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (DeL Super.
1969); Norman v. Worldwide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195
A.2d 115 (1963).
50 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
51 Norman was told by Worldwide the check for eighty dollars owed to
him for referrals would be forwarded when an ill treasurer returned
to work. Evidently the illness was terminal and out of respect and
grief for the deceased the seller retired the office of treasurer, for the
consumer never received the check.
52 Later developments revealed that Peoples had purchased the $1000
agreement and note for $831. 202 Pa. Super. at 56, 195 A.2d at 117.
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guaranteeing such payments and that they were not bound to give
Norman any credit. Norman could not find a phone listing or an
address for the seller, Worldwide, and thus he was apparently left
with nothing but a large contract liability to an entity immune
from his defenses.
Like the trial court, the appellate court did not find the finance
company's story convincing. On the authority of sections 2-302,
1-203, and 1-201(19) it denied holder in due course immunity to the
assignee, and further found the contract unconscionable. When an
assignee claims immunity from a defense (like fraud) which appears
good on its face, the burden of showing that it is a holder in due
course shifts to the assignee as the claiming party.r3 The size of the
discount at which the contract was offered to the finance company
should have alerted it to inquire into the seller's business practices.5
D. CoNcLusioxs
Article Two provides consumer protection against unconscionable
contracts under section 2-302 by instructing the courts to police
explicitly against such contracts and thereby prevent unnecessarily
harsh terms from being inflicted in one-sided contract bargaining.
Factors alerting the court to possible overreaching include a party's
education, bargaining knowledge and skill, and other obvious per-
sonal characteristics, all of which tend to affect the equality of the
bargaining.
Large price variations between value and cost of contract items,
large discount rates to assignees and illusory reimbursement plans
may also be enough to render a contract unconscionable. The bar-
gaining itself, when some combination of the above factors is
present, can render any resulting contract unenforceable. Also, the
terms themselves, when some of the above are evident, may be
substantively unconscionable, that is, of such a nature that public
policy dictates they not be upheld.
Section 2-302 may not distinguish between procedural and sub-
stantive unconscionability clearly enough for students of contract
theory, but to the advocate trying to provide consumer protection
for his clients the section is clear enough. It does not restrict courts
to any one set of criteria, but allows the courts to examine a sales
contract in the light of the facts of the commercial setting.
53 Id. at 58, 195 A.2d at 118.
r4 In the Norman case, Peoples and Worldwide were in truth operated
by the same personnel, so inquiry would have imposed no burden as
such but was a meaningless act since the left hand rarely is unaware
of what the right hand is doing. See also Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
232 A.2d 1405 (1967).
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III. WARRANTY
Many consumers do not become involved in unconscionable
transactions. They buy from reputable merchants, who aggressively
maximize their profit, but who also expect the consumer to ade-
quately protect his own interests. The need for consumer protection
in these sales, as in the unconscionable sales, is great. Whenever the
merchant either offers, or attempts to limit the warranty for the
goods he sells, and that warranty is one of the considerations in-
fluencing the buyer's choice of that product, there is clearly a need
to protect the consumer's reliance. While this comment does not
attempt to analyze warranty law history, the origins of the UCC
warranty sections are an important source that the lawyer needs to
use in ascertaining the intended effect of the UCC warranty pro-
visions. "The warranties of the Sales Act [the Uniform Sales Act,
hereinafter USA] have been reclassified and expanded by the
Code."55 The USA has been the law governing many of the cases
used as examples in part B of this warranty discussion.
Five sections of Article Two, concerning warranty protection
applicable to the consumer, will be examined. Sections 2-313 through
2-31751 respectively entail the following concepts: express war-
ranty; implied warranty of merchantability with regard to trade
usage; implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; exclu-
sion or modification of warranties; and cumulation and conflict of
warranties, express or implied. The warranty concepts involved
in product liability cases are not included within the scope of this
comment, as they are on the borderline of tort law, and consumers
usually have little difficulty finding an attorney or getting protection
in these circumstances. 57
A. GENERAL HISTORY
1. Express Warranty
Section 2-313 concerns the creation and application of express
warranties. Involved is the separation of harmless "puffing" from
promises meant to form a part of the basis of the bargain. There
is no concrete test applicable to contract bargaining to differentiate
55 Davenport, The Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction
and Articles 1 and 2, 43 NEB. L. REv. 671, 699 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Davenport]. The article contains not only a review of the war-
ranty sections, but, as the title implies, all of Article Two.
5G See appendix, infra, for the text of these sections.
-7 See, Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 17 WEST. RFs. L. Rzv. 5 (1965); Littlefield,
Some Thoughts on Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor
Shanker, 18 WEST. RES. L. REV. 10 (1966).
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between the two, but under the UCC, descriptions of goods, and
samples or models which are used in a sales talk, can become a
basis of the bargain and thus an express warranty that the goods
will be as represented would arise.58 An affirmation of the value of
goods, or a statement purporting to be the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods, does not create a warranty; 9 therefore, the
consumer may be in a difficult position in trying to decide what was
meant to be a basis of the bargain promise.
Like section 2-302, the warranty provisions encourage the taking
of evidence of the commercial setting in which the parties bar-
gained.60 Clearly this is sound policy if, "[i]n effect the ordinary
contracts of sale are contracts of adhesion, presented to consumers
under conditions of haste, ignorance and compulsion." 61 In such a
case "the conflict between a printed public presentation and a
printed denial that any representation was made should not be
resolved by the signature of the buyer beneath the denial. '62
Basically the basis of the bargain test in section 2-313 is a carry-
over from the express warranty provision of the USA, but there
have been some changes in the old section twelve. The creation of
a warranty by use of description, or samples of goods, is one such
alteration.6 The effect which section 2-209(1)64 gives to a modifica-
tion, made without consideration, of a signed contract by interpret-
ing such an action as a promise meant as a warranty,6 is another
change. A further difference from section twelve of the USA, and
the common law requirements of express warranty, is the negative
language that "merely the seller's opinion [of value] or commenda-
tion of the goods does not create a warranty"66
58 Davenport, note 55 supra, at 699.
59 UCC § 2-313 (2). See Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138,
154, 84 N.W.2d 151, 161 (1957).
60 The Nebraska Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to
examine the true commercial setting of a disputed contract with re-
gard to warranty creation, rather than render judgment on the appear-
ance of a bargained for acceptance of the seller's interpretation of
the offer. See Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84
N.W.2d 151 (1957); Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198(1963).
61 Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. Rlv.
318, 328 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 77 HARv. L. REv.].
62 Id. at 329.
63 Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Recent
Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1430,
1432 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 64 MicH. L. REv.].
64 UCC § 2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.
65 64 MICH. L. REv., note 63 supra, at 1433.
66 UCC § 2-313 (2). See 64 MicH. L. REv., note 63 supra, at 1432-35.
826 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 49, NO. 4 (1970)
2. Implied Warranties
Before an implied warranty of merchantability attaches, section
2-314 requires that the merchant making a sale be one who normally
deals in the type of goods sold.67 The comprehensive tests listed
under subsection two 68 are not exhaustive, and "often, implied
warranties may arise from the course of dealing or usage of trade."6 9
The language used refers to standards of the trade, generally an
objective test, which applies with equal force to all consumers
regardless of their income level or personal characteristics.
Conversely, the creation of an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, the subject of section 2-315, is dominated by the
needs of a particular consumer or buyer:
'[P]articular purpose' differs from the ordinary purpose for which
goods are used in that it envisages a special use by the buyer which
is peculiar to the nature of the business whereas ordinary pur-
poses for which goods are used are those envisaged in the mer-
chantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the
goods in question. 70
The buyer need not make known the specific purpose for which
he purchases; it is enough that the seller have knowledge of the
buyer's reliance on the seller's choice of particular goods for his
needs.71 This language focuses on the buyer's needs, not the stan-
dards of the trade, in determining if a warranty has been created.
The creative advocate uses the facts about his consumer-client under
section 2-315, whereas under 2-314 any warranty creation is limited
to the usage of the trade in which a consumer has been dealing.
Both the merchantability and fitness concepts, as they appear in
the UCC, are identical to their counterparts, section fifteen, sub-
sections two and three, in the USA.
3. Exclusion or Modification
Section 2-316 is of particular importance to the consumer, for
it controls any limitation or negation of warranties which the
seller may attempt. Generally, actions or provisions tending to
create and/or negate warranties should be construed consistently
whenever possible. Parol evidence 72 may be used to resolve conflicts
under this section, pursuant to the restrictions placed upon its use
by subsection one to the extent negation or limitation may be inop-
67 UCC § 2-314(1).
68 See appendix, infra, for text of section.
69 UCC § 2-314(3).
70 UCC § 2-315, Comment 2.
71 77 HA.Rv. L. REV., note 61 supra, at 319.
72 UCC § 2-202.
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erative where unreasonable. 3 The real consumer protection is found
in subsection two's requirement that any language or writing ex-
cluding or modifying warranties of merchantability must mention
merchantability and be conspicuous. As to any attempt to exclude
or modify warranties of fitness, it must be in writing and it must be
conspicuous.7 4
Examples of language sufficient to exclude some warranties, and
buyers' actions which may prevent warranty creation under section
2-316 of the UCC are included therein.7 5 By complying with section
2-316 the seller may, of course, also protect himself.
Subsection four allows remedies for breach of warranty to
be limited in accordance with the Article Two provisions on
liquidation and limitation of damages, or contractual modification
of remedy 7 6 This comment does not embrace the UCC remedy
protection available7 7 to the consumer, but in passing it should
be pointed out that any limitation of the common law remedies
will not be enforced under the UCC if they are unconscionable
under 2-302.
4. Cumulation and Conflict
While express and implied warranties should be construed con-
sistently, or cumulatively, the patties may in fact want to specify
which are dominant in the case of conflict, or the unreasonableness
of consistent construction.78 Three rules for the ascertainment of
which warranties may prevail are included in section 2-317. They
call for technical specifications, samples from existing bulk, or
express warranties to displace irregularities in the models and
general descriptions, inconsistent language, or implied warranties
other than fitness for a particular purpose.79 It is reasonable to give
added weight to any language, or object, which is on its face more
specific than an alternative, when, as in these cases, one is trying to
determine what was the standard that the goods were supposed to
meet.
73 UCC § 2-316(1) and Comment.
74 UCC § 2-316 (2) and Comment.
75 Language such as: "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof" is sufficient to exclude all implied war-
ranties of fitness. In addition, examination of goods, samples or models
to the extent the buyer desires, or a refusal to examine goods, negates
any implied warranties to the extent of defects such an examination
should have revealed. UCC § 2-316 (3) (c). Of course the buyer may
have an argument he was not allowed to examine goods to the extent
desired.
76 UCC § 2-316 (4).
77 See UCC §§ 2-718, -719.
78 UCC § 2-317.
79 UCC § 2-317(a), (b), (c).
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5. Third Party Beneficiary
Another section of the UCC which is relevant to this comment
is section 2-31880 which controls the extension of the warranty pro-
tection, discussed under other sections, to third parties. While the
official comment declares that the section is neutral,81 that is, does
not restrict or enlarge developing case law in the area, Alternative
A, adopted in thirty states, limits beneficiaries of the seller's war-
ranty protection to the family, household, or guests of a buyer. This
is a reduction of coverage afforded by the original section 2-318, now
present as Alternative B.32
6. Conclusion
As in the unconscionable contract, the consumer in warranty
actions may need to overcome holder in due course immunity to
assert his defenses, or claims, arising from a sale. The same factors
discussed above concerning the relationship between the assignor
and assignee of a contract, will govern whether a buyer may assert
breach of warranty as a defense against an assignee suing for
default.
Before demonstrating how the warranty protection available
under Article Two could be argued in a typical consumer situation
involving bait advertising, a study of some of the cases utilizing
warranty concepts to provide consumer protection will demonstrate
how effective these sections can be.8 3
B. CASE EXAMPLES
In Brown v. Globe Laboratories,8 4 the Nebraska Supreme Court
had to distinguish puffing from promises meant to be accepted as
the basis of the bargain.8 5 After Brown had purchased and used a
bacterial substance to immunize his sheep, they became diseased.
He brought suit against the producer-seller alleging, among other
things, breach of warranty, express and implied, on the part of the
80 See appendix infra.
81 Editorial Board Note on 1966 Amendment, UCC § 2-318. This section is
more correctly the subject of an in depth study.
82 UCC § 2-318, Alternative B.
83 For an excellent study of the many unsolved problems still facing
the consumer see, Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76
YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
84 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
85 See, Donnelson v. Fairmont Foods Co., 252 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952), holding an express warranty is an affirmation of fact or promise
by seller relating to goods, which has a natural tendency to induce
the buyer to purchase goods.
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defendant. In affirming the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court
found sufficient evidence of the creation of a warranty to approve
the trial court's instructions as to their existence.
The language "as good as any obtainable" amounted only to
puffing or sales talk and did not create express warranties. 6
However, the company's printed circular, mailed to many customers
and generally available for distribution, contained large capital-
letter type setting out statements as to the development and duration
of immunity resulting from the product's use. These were sufficient
to create an express warranty as the "jury could have properly
found that there was both express and implied warranty [to] estab-
lish a positive degree of immunity from [disease] and that it was
reasonably fit for such purpose."8 7
While the sales talk used by the company's representative in-
cluded puffing, it was also competent to create certain implied
warranties under the USA provisions applicable at the time of the
contract; the provisions are the same as sections 2-314 and 2-315
of the UCC.88 When the consumer made known his particular
purpose for buying and it appeared, or should have reasonably
appeared, to the seller that the buyer was relying on the seller's
skill and judgment in the selection of one particular product, the
goods recommended carried an implied warranty of fitness for such
known purposes.8 9
While the sales language used in the bargaining may not in and
of itself have created a warranty, the combination of the seller's
printed advertising and his knowledge of the consumer's reliance
on the selection of the particular product the seller held out to
satisfy the buyer's needs, affected the commercial transaction to the
extent that both express and implied warranties secured the con-
tract's performance to the buyer's satisfaction.
The role of advertising in warranty creation was also emphasized
in Gherna v. Ford Motor Co.90 In an action for fire damage to his
car, the consumer-plaintiff appealed a nonsuit judgment of the trial
court. The appellate court reversed, holding that one who engages
in advertising to bring goods, and their quality, to the public's at-
tention, and thereby engender demand for the goods, must reason-
ably know representations constitute an express warranty running
directly to the buyer purchasing the goods in reliance thereon.91
80 165 Neb. at 154, 84 N.W.2d at 161.
87 Id. at 157-58, 84 N.W.2d at 162.
88 See discussion of these sections under section I A supra.
89 165 Neb. at 157, 84 N.W.2d at 162.
00 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
91 Id. at 652, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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The recognition of advertising as a source of warranty creation
could provide the consumer a prolific source of arguments to use
against a seller.92
Loomis Bros. Corp. v. Oweu 3 is another case where the existence
of an implied warranty for fitness may have protected the consumer
from liability for goods which were of no use to him. The consumer
purchased storm windows after examining samples of the same in
his home. The windows delivered conformed to the samples shown
him, and, in effect, met the standards of merchantability, but they
failed to keep out the wind and weather of the climate in which the
home of the buyer was located. The court found there was a suffici-
ent question of breach of warranty of fitness for purposes intended
to put the issue to a jury, and opened a confession of judgment
entered by authority of the sales contract.
The result of these few cases was that if goods did not meet needs
of which the seller was aware, then the buyer's purchase was futile.
Where the buyer's wants remain unsatisfied in this manner there
has been a failure of consideration and the contract should not be
enforced. To hold a buyer to a contract from which he received
nothing of value would be unconscionable. A case using both war-
ranty and unconscionability concepts, to make sure a buyer had
the performance he had bargained for, was Vlases v. Montgomery
Ward & Company.9 4 The suit against the defendant department
store chain was for breach of warranty in the sale of one day old
chicks to the plaintiff. The court, in construing sections 2-314 and
2-315 of the UCC, found both were designed to protect buyers of
goods from bearing a loss where merchandise delivered does not
-violate any express promise, but still does not conform to normal
commercial standards or meet a buyer's particular use. The chicks
died after a very brief period in the buyer's possession and it was
found that the cause of illness must have occurred while in the
seller's possession. Failure to imply that certain standards should
govern the conduct of the seller could render the entire bargain
unconscionable. Sections 1-102(3)1 5 and 2-302 prohibit enforcement
92 See, Miller, Labels and Advertising That Lead to Liability, 1966 ABA
SECT. INs., NEG. & COMP. LAW 918 (1966); Comment, Cigarette Adver-
tising: Deceptive and Against the Public Interest, 17 K&N. L. REV.
688 (1969). Cf. Funk v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d
771, 258 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1965), which held a buyer may reasonably rely
upon representations by his seller through mass media advertising.
93 46 Del. Co. 79, 17 Pa. D. & C. 402 (1955).
94 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
95 UCC § 1-102. Purposes: Rules of Construction; Variation by Agree-
ment.(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agree-
ment, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the
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of sales contracts, which might be deemed unconscionable, when
goods exchanged are found to be totally worthless. 96
Implied warranties are imposed by law for the protection of the
buyer, and their creation does not depend upon the affirmative
intention of the parties.9W A finding of unconscionability is also an
operation of law which can override a party's apparent intention
to agree to oppressive contract terms. Vlases applies both concepts
to a situation where one party finds a promise has not been recipro-
cated with consideration or an acceptable substitute therefore.
As outlined above, any attempt to limit a contract warranty
must be conspicuous, if in writing, and designed to attract the
buyer's attention if section 2-316 is to uphold the limitation. When
the seller fails to make his intention obvious, the buyer may still
enjoy any and all implied warranties normally accompanying a
particular sale.
Case decisions indicate that the conspicuousness of the print
may be more important than the clarity of the qualifying language
itself. For example, language held not sufficient to exclude all
warranties when it was printed in the same type size as the rest of
the contract, read: "Buyer acknowledges delivery, examination, and
acceptance of said car in its present condition."98 The meaning is
clear enough, but the likelihood of its catching a consumer's eye is
slight. Alerting the buyer to the existence of terms essential to the
contract offer is as crucial as the impact of the terms themselves.
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed
by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may
by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of
such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable.
96 377 F.2d at 850.
97 Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525, 148 N.W.2d 385 (1967). The transaction
in this case occurred while the USA provisions, identical to those of
UCC § 2-315, were in force. The dispute was over a defective water
softening unit which allegedly breached an implied warranty of fitness.
Since the creation of such a warranty operates at law for the buyer's
protection, in contemplation of a business transaction profitable to
both parties, the court held the doctrine should be extended rather
than restricted.
98 First National Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205
N.E.2d 547 (1965). But see Ryan v. ALD, Inc., 140 Mont. 300, 427
P.2d 533 (1967), in which bold print on the front of a contract directed
buyer's attention to reverse side of paper by stating, "conditions on
the reverse side which are a part of this agreement," was held sufficient
notice to consumers of essential terms excluding warranties even
though the terms were printed in difficult to read, dim, small, and
blurred type. As to the UCC definition of conspicuous see UCC §
1-201(10); Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1966); and Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation
Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969).
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When the chances are reasonably good that the existence of im-
portant terms, affecting the buyer's rights, will be realized, the size
and clarity of the print covering those terms is not as crucial. Since
the buyer apparently knows of contract qualifications he is put on
inquiry to take the time to find out what those terms are, even if
that includes reading "fine print.199
C. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the best way to summarize or conclude what part II
of this comment has said about the use of warranty law under the
UCC, to provide consumer protection, would be to apply that "law"
to the hypothetical facts of a typical consumer problem. One prob-
lem which has especially plagued the low income consumer has
been the bait and switch sale, or bait advertising. Recognition of
the vital role of advertising in the creation of both express and
implied warranties may lay the groundwork for using warranty
arguments to void sales growing out of bait advertising.
When an advertisement reads "Furnish your living room and
bedroom with two beautiful suites of furniture for only $299," the
consumer should know that the probability of the "bait and switch"
sale is great. If upon visiting the advertising store the consumer
finds the merchandise is nowhere in sight, or is told by a salesman
it is so bad that he (the consumer) would not want it in his home,
there should be no doubt that the consumer is in the middle of a bait
advertising game. All the other merchandise which the consumer
will be shown, as the kind of goods he would want in his home, costs
hundreds of dollars more than did the bait. The sales approach
which plays upon the low income consumer's strong desire not to
be below a standard of living enjoyed by most Americans, and
emphasizes the consumer's "good taste" in buying quality merchan-
dise, rather than the "bait," is effective.
Even consumers of average income, who are able to make the
larger than planned monthly payments, may find their monthly
budgets soon fail under the strain of the expense of quality furni-
ture. Here warranty protection, as it has been approached in the
first part of this discussion, may void the burdensome contract.
Reasoning from Brown and Gherna, the seller should reasonably
know the buyer, particularly the low income buyer who has not, or
does not, shop around for the best buy, may be relying on the seller's
representation of "beautiful furniture" at prices the buyer can
afford, as truly being the kind of a purchase he can afford to make.
Arguably the goods sold to the buyer in the bait advertising sale
99 Ryan v. ALD, Inc., 140 Mont. 300, 427 P.2d 533 (1967).
COMMENT
may be warranted to fit the particular purpose which the buyer
requires. Furthermore, the advertisement expressly promised beau-
tiful suites of furniture at a bargain price. Why isn't the advertise-
ment merely puffing or permissible sales talk?
Certainly those who use bait advertising know their advertise-
ment attracts the attention of those who find it most necessary to
stretch limited incomes if they are to approach minimum standards
of a comfortable life. The seller's advertisement does have more
than a routine offer of furniture in its language, as it promises a
chance to enjoy beautiful goods at a price within reach of the
reader.100 The language dispels consumer hesitancy to make a
buying decision and he enters the store making the offer predisposed
to the idea of purchasing "beautiful suites of furniture for $299."
In a court of law it would involve simply a proof of fact to
demonstrate how bait advertising affects the low income consumer.
Statistics could prove: ' 0 1 (1) the magnified desires of this consumer
class to enjoy a good living standard and (2) the high frequency
with which those attracted by bait advertising actually do "buy
up" to more expensive goods than the offer presented. Theoretically
it may be no different to hold a seller to a promise to immunize
sheep effectively, than it is to hold him to a promise to provide
"two beautiful suites of furniture for $299." This is especially
true when the seller knows the real concern of the buyer is not
just for beautiful furniture, but for beautiful furniture within
his ability to pay.
While no authority is directly on point for a price warranty
argument, the liability that one must incur to buy goods is one of the
most essential contract terms. To the low income consumer living in
a rich nation, it may be the single most important characteristic of
the goods. Since one can get quality goods if one can pay the asking
price, the real problem for the low income buyer is to find goods
which satisfy consumers' needs, which include durability and some
attractiveness, selling at a price within his ability to pay. The
price to the low income consumer is just as important a quality of
the goods as is the durability or the attractiveness which concerns
buyers of all income levels.
100 Cases involving a very similar problem are those in which a consumer
treats an advertisement as an offer to sell and he accepts the offer upon
reading, then must go to the advertiser to inform him of the acceptance
and pick up the goods. See Lefkowitz v. Great Minnesota Surplus
Store, 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957); Craft v. Elder & Johnston
Co., 38 N.E.2d 416 (C.A. Ohio 1941).
101 Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effec-
tive Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 416 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as 114 U. PA. L. REV.].
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Incorporating Loomis, it may not be enough to give a buyer
merchantable goods, for the more expensive furniture is admittedly
worth the money to one who can use it (that is, pay for it), as the
storm windows which Loomis bought were merchantable goods
which conformed to the samples shown him. But if, like the storm
windows which were worthless to Loomis because they could not
keep the weather out of his home, the expensive furniture is
worthless to the consumer because he cannot pay for it (enjoy
it) then perhaps an implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar use, and an express promise as to price, has been breached. 1° 2 The
price of the furniture is the overriding consideration for the low
income consumer in making his decision to buy, a seller capitalizing
on this sensitivity should be held to the promise held out to the
buyer in the advertisement-that the goods are priced within his
reach or needs. When the advertising promise makes the subsequent
sale elose to a certainty then the promise should be kept, if not for
reasons of contract law then certainly for reasons of public policy.
Section 2-302 may have relevance to the bait and switch sale.
Inequality of bargaining power because of the education, bar-
gaining skill, and other general characteristics of the parties is
probably instrumental in the success of bait and switch situations.
The arguments found in the law review articles, and in the cases
under part I on unconscionability would probably be appropriate
in many of the bait and switch sales. The warranty approach con-
cerns itself with actual promises exchanged, however, and when
parties of apparently equal ability have struck a bargain in the
bait and switch situation, the consumer who was originally attracted
by the offer in the advertisement still has a right and a need to force
the seller to honor his original presentation. If the UCC law of
warranty continues to progress in the direction it is now heading,
consumer protection can be expected to grow along with it.
IV. RELATED PROBLEMS
Other problems which have blocked effective consumer protec-
tion under the UCC are being solved. The holder in due course
immunity, which shielded assignees from buyer's defenses in a
contract, is now subject to a finding of fact that the holder should
not or could not have known of misconduct on the part of his
assignee. Factors which should alert the court to possible collusion
or knowledge of the assignee of over-pricing and faulty service in
a contract are large discounts in the sale of the contracts to the
102 Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MiCH. L. REv. 1202, 1226
(1966).
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assignee, or almost instantaneous assignment of purchase agree-
ments by a selling agency.10
However, any advantages the consumer may have acquired by
the limiting of holder in due course immunity are eroded by the
organized bar's ignorance of the case law. An attorney for a large
finance company admitted he used the holder in due course im-
munity doctrine "to scare away lawyers ... and you can count the
ones that know about the Norman case on your fingers."'04
Some state legislatures have passed "cooling off" bills 05 which
can be used to fight high pressure door-to-door selling techniques.
These bills usually allow from twenty-four to seventy-two hours to
post a letter to a company with whom one has contracted, through
a door-to-door salesman, to inform the company of an intention to
cancel the contract. Proof of the buyer's intention is a postmark
within the allotted time period, and not acknowledged receipt at
the company's offices within the time provided. 10
Consumer business education can curb the lack of knowledge
about bargaining and buying realities which trap many economically
poor consumers. Proposals have suggested beginning courses in
grade school which would combat unethical business practices.
Such courses would teach students how to read labels and contracts
in light of truth in lending and truth in packaging requirements. 07
One last problem in providing consumer protection cannot be
rectified by education or legislation, and it directly affects use of
the UCC. The cost of using the legal process to fight an "illegal"
contract is often equal to or greater than paying the contract debt.
In the Williams case, Mrs. Williams would have been defenseless
without the Legal Aid organization operated by the Washington,
D.C. bar association. The Chief Staff Attorney, Pierre Doslert, wrote
in a letter to Robert H. Skilton, "[the] trial, appeal to the D. C. Court
of Appeals, and then to the U.S. Circuit Court took 210 manhours
of legal work for which the appellants were not obligated to pay.' 08
What will become of clients like Mrs. Williams when offices like
Legal Aid have full case loads and consumers must be turned away?
103 Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d
115 (1963). See also the discussion of unconscionability and holder in
due course immunity in section I supra.
104 114 U. PA. L. REv., note 101 supra, at 416.
105 The Nebraska Unicameral moved such a bill to final reading before
it became burdened with amendments and was killed on the floor. See
L.B. 827, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
100 See, e.g., L.B. 827, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
107 114 U. PA. L. REv., note 101 supra, at 447-48.
108 Skilton & Helstad, note 7 supra, at 1480.
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Consumer class action suits could be one alternative, but the
mechanics and perhaps the theory of these could prove difficult.1 0 9
Solicitation of clients, which would help identify those having claims
against any one merchant, is forbidden. The prohibition is based on
the theory that the practice of law is properly a branch of the
administration of justice and not a mere money-making trade."0
That premise does not seem relevant to the realities of representing
financially deprived consumers against fraudulent businessmen.
Legal Aid offices are permitted to use the public airways to broad-
cast messages encouraging those who feel they have need for legal
help to contact them. Under restrictive controls perhaps private
attorneys could likewise publish the existence of a suit against
some particular merchant to encourage others who have dealt with
this defendant to join the lawsuit. By doing this, legal protection
could be provided without "reduced rates," which are improper, and
the cost of these suits would be distributed among the plaintiffs.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment has not attempted to examine how the UCC,
and cases construing it, have changed long legal histories of
cherished doctrine; rather, it presents cases and articles representa-
tive of the types of arguments which could be used to provide
consumer protection under the UCC and Article Two. Unconscion-
ability and warranty concepts extend protection to consumers to
negate or limit liability for contracts unreasonably made, whether
because of price or quality considerations.
A creative advocate should treat the UCC not as a body of static
or inflexible rules, but rather as an outline of pliable legal concepts
which may be shaped by the contracting parties to the facts of their
particular transaction. While the cases used in this comment have
often dealt with low income consumers, the arguments for allowing
unconscionability or warranty protection can apply to a consumer
of any station.
Courts are showing an impatience with commercial law which
has permitted one party to take advantage of another."' The right
to due process should extend to the enforcement of a contract when
the judiciary is used to accomplish the satisfaction of contract
liability.
109 See Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of
Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REV. 407 (1969); Comment, The State-Consumer
Antitrust Class Action, 49 NEB. L. REv. 840 (1970).
110 Barton v. State Bar of California, 209 Cal. 677, 682, 289 P. 818, 820
(1930).
111 See State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
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Warranty protection, traditionally available when goods or ser-
vices purchased did not meet contract or trade standards, should be
a source of further consumer protection. When a buyer has made
it reasonably clear to a seller that he relies on his selection of goods
to fulfill the buyer's needs, the commercial setting is similar to that
of the unequal bargaining situation where one party has power to
dictate terms to another. Just as courts will police against un-
conscionable contracts arising from those situations, they may hold
a seller to the promise (expressly or impliedly made) that his
selection of goods represents the goods the buyer needs. The goods
then must in actuality fulfill the buyer's needs.
When a seller has advertised to attract a party to his goods
(engender a demand) and he knows that the advertisement implies
and expressly promises certain things to a particular buyer, then
the promise held out should be enforced against the offeree. Ad-
mittedly, warranty has usually not encompassed price provisions,
but cases on the offer made by mass advertisement" 2 are close to
doing so. The court's willingness to scrutinize price provisions for
unconscionable dealing may be evidence of a growing tendency
to examine the cost of goods in a contract from more than just the
viewpoint that "it was decided upon."
Government on both the state and federal levels is showing an
interest in consumer affairs. It is time for the legal profession to
utilize the unique power it wields in the judiciary to make the
ideals of consumer protection realities. The legislative and the
executive branches cannot be as directly or as immediately respon-
sive to the public's needs--or as successful in answering them.
The job of the advocate was clearly stated in the appellant's brief in
Williams:
Nothing is harder to explain in this world to those people [low
income consumers] than the injustice produced by the unwilling-
ness of the bench to deal with the substance of a transaction. These
persons cannot appreciate the limitations of the application of strict
legal principles of law, nor should they be required to reason with
the astuteness of a legal mind.1 s
Just as the Williams court showed a willingness to deal with the
substance of the transaction, so must the bar and bench if consumer
protection is to be a reality and not just an ideal.
Douglas F. Duchek '71
112 Note 100 supra.
113 Brief for Appellant at 11, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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APPENDIX
§ 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have
a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
§ 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
§ 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
§ 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to
the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
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(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchant-
ability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
anties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the cir-
cumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with
the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and
on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
§ 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express or Implied
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent
with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreason-
able the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is domi-
nant. In ascertaining that intention the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample
or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general
language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties
other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose.
§ 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person
of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
